Counter-Surveillance

Hamburg, Germany: Tracking technology discovered on motor scooter

Posted on 2023/05/17 by darknights

In the last few days, a so-called “AirTag” from Apple was found in the seat of a scooter. The scooter is used by an anarchist from Hamburg, who has already been the subject of Surveillance and investigative measures in the past. The small, flat device of an approximate diameter of 3 centimeters and a height of less than 1 centimeter, was placed through a slit in the seat cushion, which was apparently made with a cutter knife or similar. The assumption is that an investigative agency or the Verfassungsschutz (german interior secret service) is responsible for the placement. Apple originally marketed the AirTags for the purpose of tagging items such as a bunch of keys, wallet or similar in the immediate vicinity of one’s of one’s smartphone. It works via Bluetooth and has an immediate maximum range of about 100 meters outdoors. It only becomes a tool for tracking the movements of another person via the “Where is? app. When this function is activated, the “lost” AirTag pairs with other iPhones or iPads (with activated Bluetooth function) in the vicinity and passes the location via the “Where is?” network to the Apple device paired with the tracker. Apple device paired with the tracker – and with inflationary use of Apple products and Bluetooth headphones, these small devices then record a potentially fairly complete movement profile, especially in urban areas. The batteries of the AirTags have a lifespan of about one year. According to Apple, the trackers emit a (quiet) beep in “Where is?” mode at regular intervals – which is sufficiently muffled by the upholstery of the scooter seat, for example. It should also be possible, by means of the “Where is?” app in iPhones and the “Airguard” app for Android to identify “lost” AirTags. There are some articles about these possibilities on the IT platform golem.de, which we recommend reading. The serial number of the AirTag theoretically allows to identify the device that was originally paired with it – but it is difficult to get hold of the data over which the Apple group has control. AirTags currently cost around 40 euros each – making them by far the cheapest way for investigators to use such devices for surveillance. A certain failure rate, gaps in the surveillance or a limited usability of the data in criminal proceedings, we estimate that these are insignificant reasons for the authorities not to use the devices. So: check your cars, scooters, bikes and so on. Continue reading “Hamburg, Germany: Tracking technology discovered on motor scooter” →

Ears and Eyes moves to the CSRC!

Posted on 2023/05/17 by darknights

Starting today, the Ears and Eyes project is now hosted by the Counter-Surveillance Resource Center (CSRC). The present website will not be updated anymore. The new address is:

https://csrc.link/earsandeyes

This new website has a modern design, is easier for us to update and brings advanced search features to our database, allowing you to filter and search through our 100 cases of surveillance devices hidden by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Feel free to check out CSRC’s other projects, including their database of resources on targeted surveillance and their Threat Library (a threat modeling tool for anarchists).

As usual, you can get in touch with us if you have feedback, criticisms or information to give us. We also welcome translations in any languages. You can now contact us at CSRC’s email address – csrc@riseup.net – or use our old address if you prefer.

Source: Ears and Eyes

The Guide to Peer-to-Peer, Encryption, and Tor: New Communication Infrastructure for Anarchists

Posted on 2023/03/26 by darknights

An exhaustive anarchist overview and guide to various apps and tech that utilize peer-to-peer and encryption.

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Secure encryption chat apps are essential infrastructure for anarchists, so they should be closely scrutinized. Signal is the dominant secure encryption tool used by anarchists today. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the fundamental architecture and development goals of Signal have potential security implications for anarchists. Signal is a centralized communication service, and centralization results in potential security implications, especially when contextualized within the current threat landscape. Alternative secure chat apps like Briar and Cwtch are Peer-to-peer communication tools that, in addition to being Encrypted like Signal, route all traffic through Tor (PET). This approach to secure communication offers great advantages for security, anonymity and privacy over more common services like Signal, but with caveats. However, anarchists should seriously consider trying and using Briar and/or Cwtch, in the interest of developing more resilient and more secure communication infrastructure.

Despite all that, the best way to communicate anything securely is still face-to-face.

Shhh…

This is a discussion about digital tools for communicating securely and privately. To begin, it must be stressed that a face-to-face meeting, out of sight of cameras and out of earshot from other people and devices, is the most secure way to communicate. Anarchists were going for walks to chat long before encrypted texting existed, and they should still do so now, whenever possible.

That being said, it’s undeniable that secure digital communication tools are now part of our anarchist infrastructure. Perhaps many of us rely on them more than we should, but there is an extent to which they have become unavoidable for coordinating, collaborating, and staying connected. Given that these tools are essential infrastructure for us, it’s crucial that we constantly scrutinize and re-evaluate their security and effectiveness at protecting our communications from our adversaries.

In the last decade or two, anarchists have been early adopters of these secure communication tools and techniques, and have played a role in normalizing and spreading their use within our own communities, as well as among others engaged in resistance and struggle. The following text is intended to present anarchists with newer tools for secure encrypted communication, and make the case that we should adopt them in order to bolster the resilience and autonomy of our infrastructure. We can learn the advantages of these new apps – how they can help dodge surveillance and repression – and subsequently employ them effectively in our movements and help spread their use more broadly. Continue reading “The Guide to Peer-to-Peer, Encryption, and Tor: New Communication Infrastructure for Anarchists” →

Strategies for Countering Police Access to DNA Data

Posted on 2023/03/23 - 2023/03/23 by darknights

Chapter 10: OPSEC for Informational Self-Determination

Source: Counter-Surveillance Resource Center

Via: Act for freedom now!

Languages: German

Download: PDF (read, A4 booklet, letter booklet) • TEXT

OPSEC is military and intelligence jargon for “operational security” and refers to techniques designed to prevent their people being caught during or after an “operation”.

The fact that we have to talk about such things at all when it comes to issues like exercising the fundamental right to freedom of assembly or small acts of civil disobedience is a clear indication of how far the state’s mania for security and collection has already developed. It is generally better to invest resources on pushing back the security apparatus than in a technical arms race with state agencies.

Nevertheless, there is of course nothing wrong with trying to avoid giving unnecessary material to state authorities and exercising the right to informational self-determination. To prevent or at least significantly limit leaving casual traces, it is necessary to wear new gloves, a face mask, a hair net or, even better, closed headgear (e.g. a swimming cap) and washed clothes with long sleeves and pant legs^[1]. Continue reading “Strategies for Countering Police Access to DNA Data” →

Who wrote that?

Posted on 2023/03/18 by darknights

2020

by Zündlumpen #76

Languages: German • English • French
Download: PDF (read, A4 booklet, letter booklet) • TEXT

A brief overview of modern forensic linguistics methods for determining authorship.

The following article tries to give an overview from a non-technical perspective and to make a corresponding evaluation. There are some academic publications on this topic that could be evaluated for a better assessment. However, my main purpose here is just to raise the issue, not to provide a sound and conclusive view so if you know anything more, publish it!

Avoiding traces that could be your undoing down the road – perhaps even after years or decades – is probably of interest to most people who occasionally commit a crime and come into conflict with the law. Avoiding fingerprints, avoiding DNA traces, avoiding shoe prints and textile fiber traces or at least disposing of clothing afterwards, avoiding surveillance cameras, avoiding tool traces, avoiding recordings of any kind, recognizing surveillance, etc. – all this should be a concern for anyone who commits crimes from time to time and wants to protect themselves from identification. But what about those traces that often arise only after a crime has been committed, out of the urge to explain one’s deed anonymously or even by using a recurring pseudonym? When writing and publishing a communiqué?

My impression is that in many cases no special attention is paid to these traces despite a rapid technological development of analytical capacities. This may be intentional, negligent, or a compromise of competing needs. Without wishing to make a general suggestion here on how to deal with these traces – after all, everyone must determine that for themselves – I would like to outline the methods the investigative authorities in Germany and elsewhere are currently (probably) working with, what seems possible in theory, and what could become possible in the future.

Perhaps I should note in advance that everything or at least most of what I present here is scientifically as well as legally controversial. I am also less interested in the legal validity of linguistic analyses – and not in the scientific one either – than in whether it seems plausible that these investigations could guide a surveillance effort, because even if a trail is not useful in court by itself, it could still lead to other, useful trails. Continue reading “Who wrote that?” →

Spain: “Bark, then ride” About the discovery of a new police infiltrator.

Posted on 2023/02/14 by darknights

In these days of commotion at the discovery of the new police infiltrator, from security culture, by allusions also, we want to launch some reflections.

Blame leads nowhere

First of all, we would like to send a warm greeting to the people who have had to deal closely with this situation. We know what it means to give our trust, time, support, affection and body to our loved ones and what it means when we are betrayed and instrumentalized. Especially if it is a case like this one, in which some of our colleagues have also been involved in more intimate relationships with this subject.

But it is useless to whip ourselves now that we already know it, when suddenly comments and ideas appear that, in the past, come out quickly, but are not very visible when the infiltration is taking place. We have to bear in mind that these tasks are part of police and state tactics with many years of experience that, in most cases, will surpass us. Either because of the means used, because of the intentions that lead the State to infiltrate someone, because we are a visible target, because they are trained for it and because we are human and we cannot always detect it easily. We count on the fact that this is something recurrent and permanent, that there have been, will be and will be more infiltrations that we have and that, until the hare jumps (in the cases in which it happens), it is complicated to find out. That is what it is all about and that is what they work hard at, however, they also have failures and letdowns of guard that allow us to pull the thread of some detail that, as unnoticed as it may seem to us, can lead to discover someone. What can be done now is to learn from the mistakes made, analyze the path of this person with us and see how it can affect us in the future. And at the same time, take into consideration the investigative work that has been done, the sensitivity in detecting suspicious behavior and the rapid dissemination of information to avoid further damage. Without forgetting the set of repressive tools that the state has at its disposal, infiltration being just one more and certainly less common compared to others.

Let’s take responsibility, let’s acquire good practices

But despite the fact that all this seeks to whip, the feeling of guilt and mistrust, it is true that it is in our hands to continue implementing a culture of security that safeguards our spaces of struggle and the people who are part of it. This goes through many axes, some of which have been exposed in these cycles of talks that were made from this project, with special emphasis on police work and forms of repression and highlighting the figure of infiltrators and whistleblowers as a tactic used. Continue reading “Spain: “Bark, then ride” About the discovery of a new police infiltrator.” →

France: Some initial notes on the investigation file against Ivan

Posted on 2023/01/25 - 2023/01/25 by darknights

The following information comes from an initial quick reading of the investigation file. Therefore, it is necessarily incomplete.

First of all, how did this investigation start?

The Anti-Terrorism Sub-Directorate (SDAT) of the judicial police began an investigation on its own initiative, at the beginning of January 2022, following “confidential information collected by [the] service” (in another document, a judge speaks of “anonymous intelligence”). The police “gathered” the names of two comrades who, according to this information, were likely to be responsible for the incendiary attacks, claimed by anarchists, which had been targeting vehicles in Paris and the surrounding area for years. In the past, different local police stations and the anti-terrorism group of the DPJ 1 (a section of the Parisian Judicial Police) had already carried out investigations, notably for “criminal association”, without success.

The National Division of Research and Surveillance (DNRS, which can be understood as the “operational unit” of the SDAT) set up an operation for tailing the two comrades. They planned to follow Ivan from January 10 to February 3, 2022, and the other person from January 17 to February 3. Concretely, this part of the file includes the statements of the DNRS agents who, in the morning, placed themselves in front of the homes of the two comrades and followed them (on foot or by car) in their movements, at work, photographed them at the supermarket, etc. It should be noted that they often lost sight of their “target” when the latter was moving on foot or by bicycle.

The second comrade was quickly cleared. The DNRS agents say that they saw and photographed Ivan putting up posters in Paris and Montreuil late in the evening of January 18. On the evening of January 21, they followed him again when he went to Paris. The comrade used his bike and the cops lost sight of him almost immediately. They then deployed four “surveillance devices” (cars come to mind). Suspecting that the comrade was still headed towards Montreuil, they placed them at four transportation corridors between Paris and this suburb. One of these “devices” recorded him on the commune of Montreuil (they lost sight of him immediately afterwards). The police used this as an indication that the comrade was responsible for the arson that occurred that night of a SFR van, in Montreuil, and of an Enedis vehicle in the twelfth Parisian district.

On February 23, the SDAT contacted the Bobigny court, which officially tasked it with investigating the comrade. Continue reading “France: Some initial notes on the investigation file against Ivan” →

China: ‘The Invisible Coat’

Posted on 2022/12/20 - 2022/12/20 by darknights

China is probably ahead of everyone else in turning the country into a digital concentration camp. CCTV cameras are installed almost at every step and residents are very tired of the constant monitoring, believing that the state thus interferes in their personal lives.

However, for every action of the state, a person looks for counteraction.

Graduate students from Wuhan University won Huawei’s cybersecurity innovation competition, demonstrating a coat whose camouflage prints can hide a person’s identity from AI cameras.

The contest winners say the prints were created using artificial intelligence. The whole point of the pattern on the fabric is to reflect light, so that surveillance cameras can’t react to visible light. At night, special devices, with which the coat is also equipped, distort the thermal radiation and thus manage to deceive the infrared sensors of smart cameras.

The “smart” coat is called InvisDefense. The creators are confident that they have found a reliable way to bypass human recognition technology. Engineers tested their development on campus surveillance cameras. According to the results of the tests, it became clear that in reality the detection accuracy is 57%.

In the future, the developers intend to create “invisible” objects for AI cameras. It can be all sorts of objects or even a car. They are also studying the possibility of bypassing other types of cameras that use remote sensing of satellites or aircraft.

The developers themselves say that their work is intended to identify vulnerabilities in the surveillance system in order to improve it. However, stealth coats are already on sale and at a relatively low price.

Source: a2day

Italy: Social Credit Score – Rome & Bologna testing new app that monitors & rewards behavior

Posted on 2022/05/03 - 2022/05/03 by darknights

In line with recommendations being laid out by the World Economic Forum and the UN 2030 Agenda, Bologna, Italy, plans to launch a social credit style app that has striking similarities with Communist China’s social credit system. The app rewards or punishes its citizens for their behavior. Dubbed “Smart Citizen Wallet,” the app will track activities such as recycling, public transportation use, and energy management.

The primary argument for the program is to “save resources” and promote climate-friendly behavior. Those displaying good behavior will collect digital coins and receive discounts at local shops based on the given scores.

The app is already active and in experimental stages in Rome and is set to go live in Bologna in Autumn. Bologna Mayor Matteo Lepore and Massimo Bugani, director of the city’s “Digital Agenda,” discussed the project at a March 29 conference. Bugani indicated the app was part of a more comprehensive effort by the city to invest in digital innovation.

In 2020, Italy and six other nations signed an agreement to become “Agile Nations” in partnership with the WEF. Besides Italy, the deal—co-organized by the OECD—includes Canada, Denmark, Japan, Singapore, UAE, and the UK and sets “each country’s commitment to creating a regulatory environment in which new ideas can thrive.” Expressly—with the Fourth Industrial Revolution front and center. Continue reading “Italy: Social Credit Score – Rome & Bologna testing new app that monitors & rewards behavior” →

To (try to) keep the cops at bay

Posted on 2021/09/21 by darknights

Source: Counter-Surveillance Resource Center

There are many guides out there that describe everything from the best ways of building timed incendiary devices, to dealing with DNA, to anti-forensic methods and how to secure digital information against search and seizure or government surveillance.

Some of them are over forty years old, others are newer, some of them still hold up while others need updating. We thought it wouldn’t hurt to have some suggestions, a brief “things to consider” article, that is reasonably up-to-date in regards to the enemy’s methods. Some lessons and experiences combined with technical info but in a format that hopefully doesn’t feel too rigid and authoritarian.

Sometimes it feels like there is a particularly repressive climate in the world or the region you live in but historically there is rarely more repression in one era than there is in another. The simple explanation is that the state is constantly waging war against its enemies, it is only more evident if one is affected by it directly or indirectly, as an individual, group or entire society. The exceptions may be situations such as world wars, but even then the mechanisms are different, and in our view it is usually possible to say that repression is constant. That is to say, it is not possible to think: I will be unaffected. Because sooner or later the spotlight will turn from yesterday’s enemy to you. Continue reading “To (try to) keep the cops at bay” →